New Gaza – A Land of Peace.

A Comprehensive Development Plan for Gaza: Transition to a Demilitarized, UN-Administered Peace State

This report outlines a comprehensive development plan for Gaza that envisions its transformation into a demilitarized peace state under direct UN control in approximately 14 years.

This ambitious proposal includes a significant population transfer, with current Gaza residents offered new lives and homes in a demilitarized West Bank as a new Palestine, also under UN control, while Israeli settlers from the West Bank are compensated with new settlements and homes in Gaza or Israel.
Throughout the period of UN control, the right to settle and establish businesses in both territories will be subject to UN rules and control. After the first approximately 14 years, independence negotiations for Gaza and the new Palestine will take place every five years.
The plan is structured around establishing a robust UN transitional administration in Gaza and the new Palestine, ensuring comprehensive demilitarization and a secure environment, promoting humane and just large-scale resettlement of the population, implementing a fair and transparent framework for property compensation and land allocation, promoting sustainable economic reconstruction, and charting a clear, phased path to negotiated independence. Drawing on historical precedents from UN-administered territories, the report identifies a UN Security Council Chapter VII mandate as the most appropriate model for a robust UN transitional administration, providing the necessary authority and robust use of force for effective mandate enforcement and disarmament.
Key challenges include the enormous logistical and social complexities associated with mass displacements of populations, the political sensitivities around property rights and compensation, and the critical need to promote genuine local ownership and legitimacy in governance and security structures to avoid prolonged dependency. The success of the plan depends on careful planning, sustained international engagement, transparent processes and a holistic approach that integrates security, humanitarian assistance, economic development and social and cultural preservation. The long UN mandate of approximately 14 years provides a unique opportunity for in-depth capacity building and the cultivation of resilient, self-governing institutions, provided that it actively involves local communities and adapts to the specific context rather than imposing external models. Ultimately, this plan seeks to lay the foundations for a stable, prosperous and self-determining future for Gaza and the new Palestine within a peaceful regional framework.
1. Introduction: Context and Vision for a New Gaza and  new Palestine:
1.1 Background to the Current Situation. The protracted conflict in the Gaza Strip and the wider Israeli-Palestinian territories has resulted in immense human suffering, widespread destruction and persistent instability. Decades of complex geopolitical dynamics, unresolved disputes and recurrent escalation of hostilities have left Gaza in a humanitarian crisis, with severely damaged infrastructure and the population facing major challenges in their daily lives and prospects. Any viable way forward requires a transformative approach that addresses the root causes of conflict, establishes a foundation for lasting peace and offers a path to sustainable development and self-determination for all affected populations. This report proposes such a transformative framework that recognizes the inherent complexities and sensitivities of the proposed solutions.
1.2 The Proposed Vision: Gaza as a Demilitarized, UN-Administered State of Peace. The core vision outlined in this plan is the establishment of Gaza as a demilitarized peace state, placed under direct UN control for a period of approximately 14 years. This period is designed to promote comprehensive reconstruction, institutional development, and the establishment of conditions conducive to long-term stability. A central and defining feature of this proposal is a significant and reciprocal population transfer: Gaza’s current residents will be offered new lives and homes in the West Bank, which will also be demilitarized and placed under UN control. At the same time, Israeli settlers currently living in the West Bank will be offered new settlements and homes in Gaza as compensation for their existing properties. During the UN administration period, the right to settle and establish businesses in both the West Bank and the new Gaza will be strictly regulated by UN rules and supervision. After the initial approx. During the 14-year period, the path to independence for Gaza will be negotiated every five years, allowing for a phased and measured transition of sovereignty.
1.3 Overall Objectives and Scope of the Development Plan.
The primary objectives underlying this development plan are multifaceted and interrelated. First, it aims to establish an effective and legitimate UN administration in Gaza and a new Palestine in the West Bank, capable of governing the territory and promoting a secure environment. Second, it seeks to ensure comprehensive demilitarization, eliminating all armed groups and military infrastructure. Third, a humane and just large-scale resettlement process for the population is essential, creating new homes and opportunities while addressing the social and psychological consequences of displacement. Fourth, a fair and transparent framework for property compensation and land allocation is essential to resolve past grievances and prevent future disputes. Fifth, the plan prioritizes sustainable economic reconstruction and development to create self-sufficiency and prosperity. Finally, it outlines a clear, phased path to negotiated independence that ensures long-term stability and self-determination. This report serves as a strategic plan that draws extensively on international precedents, the experiences of previous UN transitional administrations, and best practices in post-conflict recovery and population resettlement.
2. The UN Transitional Administration Model for Gaza (Grades 1-14)
2.1 Mandate and Authority: Adapting UN Precedents. The United Nations has a significant history of administering territories, a role primarily carried out by the Trusteeship Council, which successfully prepared 11 Trust Territories for self-government or independence in 1994. More recent direct administrations, distinct from trust territories administered by a single country under a UN mandate, include the United Nations Interim Executive Authority in West New Guinea (1962-1963), the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (1992-1993), the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (1996-1998), the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (1999-present, albeit with a reduced mandate), and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor. (1999-2002).
For Gaza, a transitional administration under Chapter VII of the UN Security Council, similar to UNTAES, UNMIK and UNTAET, represents the most logical and effective operational model given the major security and governance challenges. This model is characterized by its robust use of force capabilities, often phrased as “all necessary means”, which is essential for the enforcement of mandates, combat operations and, in particular, for the comprehensive disarmament of armed groups and the management of disaffected factions. A significant advantage of the Chapter VII model is that it does not legally require the consent of the territorial state for the deployment and implementation of the mandate, a crucial consideration given the complex and often unclear lines of authority and responsibility in Gaza. Furthermore, this model gives the transitional administrator greater operational freedom, as he or she reports directly to the UN Security Council and the Secretary-General, rather than being constrained by rigid parameters set by relevant States in basic agreements, as was the case with Chapter VI operations such as UNTAC.
The proposed UN administration, hereinafter referred to as the United Nations Transitional Administration in Gaza (UNTAG), would assume broad legislative, executive and judicial authority over the territory. Its mandate would include maintaining security and order, facilitating humanitarian assistance, rehabilitating and developing critical infrastructure, administering all aspects of the territory, and establishing structures for sustainable governance and the rule of law.
The proposed approximately 14-year UN control period for Gaza is significantly longer than the typical duration of most historical UN transitional administrations, which often aimed for faster transitions (e.g. UNTEA was seven months, UNTAET three years, UNTAC 1.5 years). This extended duration presents both significant opportunities and inherent risks, but reflects the nature, duration and complexity of the conflict. On the one hand, it allows for a more deliberate and phased approach to capacity and institution building. Previous missions such as UNTAET and UNMIK, while robust, struggled to foster genuine “ownership” and integrate local norms, and often imposed Western models, leading to government structures lacking accountability and responsibility among the population. The success of security sector reform (SSR) in Timor-Leste, for example, was hampered by a failure to build host nation capacity, leading to prolonged dependence on external actors. A longer period of time allows UNTAG to integrate local expertise, gradually transfer responsibilities and truly cultivate “local ownership” from the outset. This approach goes beyond simply establishing formal institutions and also ensures that they are legitimate and responsive to the local population, which is essential for long-term stability and to avoid the pitfalls observed in Kosovo and East Timor.
Conversely, an extended duration also carries the risk of creating a long-term dependency on external actors, potentially undermining the very goal of self-determination. If the UN administration is perceived as an occupying power or fails to secure sufficient local support over such a long period, its legitimacy may be eroded, leading to resistance and instability, as the process of gaining legitimacy for a regime is endogenous and cannot be effectively imposed by external actors. Therefore, an extended duration necessitates a proactive strategy to continuously engage with and strengthen local communities and emerging political structures. This includes clear communication of the phased transition plan, early establishment of advisory bodies with real authority, and measurable benchmarks for local ownership to prevent the administration from becoming a permanent part of the system that stifles initial political development.
A comparative analysis of historical UN transitional administrations provides valuable context for the proposed UNTAG structure:
2.2 Establishment of the United Nations Interim Administration in Gaza (UNTAG) The establishment of UNTAG would entail a comprehensive takeover of all administrative functions, mirroring the direct administration model used by UNTAET in East Timor. This would involve the immediate establishment of a robust civilian administrative structure, including departments responsible for essential public services such as health, education, water, electricity, sanitation and social welfare. The design of this structure would incorporate mechanisms for gradual “Timorisation” or “Kosovarisation”, whereby local personnel would gradually be integrated into and eventually assume decision-making roles across all administrative levels.
A new, impartial justice system is essential given the likely disruption or destruction of existing legal frameworks and infrastructure. This would involve the establishment of courts (e.g. district courts, a national appeals court), prosecution services and a defence service. Developing a comprehensive legal framework, recruiting and training local legal professionals (judges, prosecutors, public defenders) and implementing robust anti-corruption measures are essential steps to ensure the rule of law and public trust. UNMIK, for example, initially administered justice and issued laws in Kosovo, setting a precedent for such an undertaking.
For a demilitarized state, internal security rests solely on a professional, multi-ethnic police force. This necessitates a comprehensive security sector reform (SSR) focusing on institutional capacity-building, civilian oversight, accountability and gender equality in the police and justice sectors. Initially, the UN police (UNPOL) would provide direct law enforcement and public security, while assisting in the development and training of a local police force and drawing lessons from experiences such as the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL).
The explicit designation of Gaza as a “demilitarized peace state” means that it will not have a traditional military. This places the entire burden of maintaining law and order on its internal police and judicial systems. Historical SSR efforts, such as those in Timor-Leste, have encountered difficulties when host nation ownership was insufficient, leading to reliance on external actors and fragile security structures. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) emphasizes a “people-centred approach” to SSR and advocates the building of security institutions that are “effective, accountable and responsive to the needs of the population”. For Gaza, the success of demilitarization depends fundamentally on the legitimacy and effectiveness of civilian security forces. A police force that is perceived as externally imposed or lacks local accountability, as observed in some UN missions, is unlikely to gain public trust or effectively maintain order in the absence of military support. Therefore, a paramount priority from the outset of UNTAG must be to cultivate a police force that is deeply rooted in and accountable to local communities. This includes prioritizing models of local policing, comprehensive human rights training for all personnel, and establishing transparent oversight mechanisms to ensure accountability. This direct link between a truly people-centered SSR approach and the effectiveness of internal security in a demilitarized state is crucial to the long-term viability of the peace plan.

2.3 Phased transition and capacity building. The approximately 14-year UN supervision period provides a unique opportunity for a deliberate, multi-stage transition to full self-government. This process should begin with the immediate establishment of consultative mechanisms, drawing inspiration from bodies such as the National Consultative Council (NCC) in East Timor or the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC) in Kosovo. These bodies should be designed to gradually increase local authority and representation and ensure that the population is increasingly involved in the interim government. The aim is to avoid an abrupt handover and instead promote a gradual transfer of responsibilities, allowing local institutions and personnel to develop the necessary capacity and experience.
It is essential that clear and measurable benchmarks for the transfer of authority are set from the outset across all sectors – civil administration, judiciary, police and financial management. These benchmarks should go beyond mere institutional presence and focus on the actual capacity of local bodies, their financial sustainability and their proven ability to deliver public services effectively. The culmination of this phased approach would be democratic elections designed to identify and empower a new, legitimate local authority to which the UN interim administrative authority would pass.
UN transitional administrations inherently struggle with the fundamental contradiction that external actors attempt to establish internal legitimacy. While elections are often perceived as legitimizing, experience in UNTAET and UNMIK showed that they sometimes reflected existing power structures or ethnic divisions rather than a genuine embrace of Western democratic principles. The ultimate success of any transition depends on genuine “inclusion” and “domestic ownership”. The UN’s roughly 14-year term of control over Gaza must actively navigate this paradox. It cannot simply impose structures and expect them to achieve immediate and lasting legitimacy. Instead, UNTAG must invest heavily in participatory governance and ensure that local leaders, civil society organizations, and community representatives are genuinely involved in decision-making, policy-making, and institution-building from the earliest stages. This means actively strengthening local voices, respecting and integrating existing social and traditional structures where relevant, and adapting governance models to Gaza’s specific cultural and political context rather than adhering to a rigid “standards before status” approach. This genuine local participation and adaptation is essential to fostering internal legitimacy and sustainable self-governance.
3. Demilitarization and Security Framework

3.1 Definition of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Gaza. A demilitarized zone (DMZ) is typically defined as a limited geographical area where military presence and associated activities are either prohibited or significantly reduced. For Gaza, the proposed plan expands this concept to include
The entire territory as a DMZ, which implies a comprehensive ban on all armed groups, military installations, and any form of weapons production or distribution. This differs significantly from traditional border buffer zones, such as the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) or the Demilitarized Zone in the Sinai Peninsula, which are typically narrow strips of land separating two states or forces, and often have heavily militarized borders.
Outside the DMZ itself.
The primary implication of designating an entire territory such as Gaza and the new Palestine as a DMZ is that internal security cannot rely on a national military force. This shifts the entire burden of law and order, including dealing with any internal armed elements or significant security threats, onto the civilian police force established by UNTAG. This requires the police force to be exceptionally robust, well-trained and capable of handling all security challenges without military support. Furthermore, the demilitarization of an entire territory necessitates extremely strict and comprehensive controls over all points of entry – land, sea and air – to prevent the smuggling of weapons or dual-use materials. This has historically been a significant challenge in Gaza, as evidenced by the extensive network of tunnels discovered along the Gaza-Sinai border used for smuggling. This model represents a significant departure from typical DMZ configurations and requires a more extensive and potentially intrusive international monitoring presence to ensure compliance.
3.2 Security Protocols and Enforcement Mechanisms. Effective implementation of the demilitarized status of Gaza, the new Palestine, will require a robust international security presence. A United Nations Security Force (UNSF) or an equivalent multinational force and observers (MFO) would be essential to monitor the demilitarization provisions. This force would operate under a Chapter VII mandate that provides the necessary authority for proactive enforcement and mandate protection, including the use of force to ensure compliance.
Continuous monitoring and verification mechanisms are essential to detect and prevent violations. This would involve deploying advanced surveillance technologies such as cameras, drones, motion sensors and radars across the territory and at its borders. The MFO in Sinai, for example, successfully employs a civilian observer unit to verify military deployments and reports its findings confidentially to the parties to the treaty, thereby building trust through its impartiality.
Strict control of Gaza’s borders is essential to prevent the smuggling of weapons, dual-use materials and unauthorized personnel. Experiences from Egypt’s efforts to destroy thousands of tunnels along the Gaza-Sinai border since 2013, and the subsequent discovery of hundreds more after October 2023, highlight the ongoing challenge of smuggling and the need for comprehensive and flexible border security measures.
While external monitoring forces, such as the MFO, are effective in verifying compliance between states, the success of internal demilitarization in Gaza will also depend largely on the willingness of the local population and the new authorities to embrace and maintain this status. The Korean Demilitarized Zone, despite its heavy fortification, continues to experience ongoing tensions, demonstrating that external control alone may not be sufficient. For Gaza to truly become a “peace state,” the security framework must go beyond mere external enforcement or separation. It must actively cultivate a shared understanding and societal commitment to peace and demilitarization among all segments of the population. This implies that UNTAG’s security strategy must include significant public outreach, community engagement and clear communication about the concrete benefits of demilitarization for long-term stability and economic development. Without this internal support and a collective embrace of the demilitarized status, external enforcement will remain a persistent, resource-intensive and potentially unsustainable challenge.
3.3 International Monitoring, Verification and Confidence-Building Measures. In addition to strict enforcement, UNTAG must actively promote dialogue and cooperation between the new Gaza administration, the West Bank administration, and Israel. Confidence-building measures are essential to foster trust and reduce tensions. The MFO’s liaison system in Sinai serves as an effective model, acting as a tool to promote dialogue, resolve issues, and provide a physical platform for meetings and interactions between Egypt and Israel. The success of this system is rooted in its ability to maintain strict neutrality and objectivity and to ensure that all parties have confidence in its observations and reports. Regular and transparent reporting on compliance with demilitarization provisions and security incidents is essential to this confidence-building process.
Traditional DMZs often operate under a deterrence model, with forces on both sides ready to retaliate and prevent aggression through the threat of immediate costs. However, the vision for Gaza is a “state of peace,” which requires a fundamental shift from deterrence to shared security. The success of the MFO in Sinai can be attributed in part to its role in fostering trust and mutual confidence between Egypt and Israel. For Gaza to truly become a “state of peace,” the security framework must evolve beyond mere separation or threats of force. It must actively cultivate a sense of shared security interests among all regional actors. This means investing in joint security committees, promoting intelligence sharing, and establishing cooperative problem-solving mechanisms (e.g., dealing with smuggling, terrorism, and anti-corruption) that build mutual trust and demonstrate the tangible benefits of cooperation. Such initiatives can gradually reduce regional tensions and improve overall stability, moving toward a more cooperative security paradigm.
3.4 Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of Armed Groups. A comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme is an essential prerequisite for achieving and maintaining Gaza’s demilitarized status. This programme should systematically collect all weapons, demobilize fighters from existing armed groups and facilitate their reintegration into civilian life.
Implementing DDR programmes is inherently complex, particularly when armed groups are deeply entrenched, lack political support for the peace process, or when host State support is inadequate. For example, UNTAET faced significant difficulties in demobilizing former FALINTIL fighters due to their loose and clandestine organizational structure. Similarly, UNMISS in South Sudan struggled with DDR efforts due to a lack of political influence and support from the government. These experiences underscore the need for careful planning and strong political will from all relevant parties.
Crucially, successful reintegration of former combatants is inextricably linked to broader economic recovery and the provision of viable opportunities. This includes comprehensive vocational training programs, targeted job creation initiatives, and essential psychosocial support to address the trauma that former combatants often experience. The success of DDR is not simply about removing weapons from circulation; it is about preventing former combatants from returning to violence due to a lack of economic alternatives or a sense of marginalization. For Gaza, the success of the DDR program, given its demilitarized status, is fundamentally linked to broader economic reconstruction and social integration efforts. If former combatants are not provided with viable economic alternatives and a sense of belonging in the new society, they can become a persistent source of instability, thereby undermining the demilitarized status. This requires DDR programs to be fully integrated into the economic development plan, ensuring that skills training and employment opportunities are readily available, culturally appropriate, and directly linked to the new economic sectors in Gaza. This comprehensive and economically integrated DDR approach is essential to reducing the risk of remilitarization and improving overall social stability.
4. Large-scale resettlement and social integration

4.1 Relocation of Gazans to the West Bank. The relocation of Gazans to the West Bank represents a monumental undertaking that requires careful planning of new housing and essential infrastructure. This process should prioritize the selection of suitable resettlement sites in the West Bank through extensive consultations with both the displaced from Gaza and the existing host communities in the West Bank. These sites should ensure reliable access to productive resources, employment opportunities and business opportunities to facilitate the restoration of livelihoods for the resettled population. New settlements should be carefully planned and provide adequate infrastructure from the outset, including reliable water supply, electricity, health facilities, educational institutions and effective waste management systems.
A significant challenge in large-scale resettlement programmes is the widespread lack of affordable and accessible housing. UNTAG should allocate significant resources to housing and explore different models. Providing building plots with appropriate infrastructure, blueprints, building materials, technical assistance and “construction allowances” can be a highly effective strategy, as community-built or self-built housing options are often better accepted and more tailored to the needs of resettlers than alternatives built by contractors.
Social and cultural integration in host communities is essential to minimize negative impacts and prevent potential conflicts. This requires extensive and ongoing consultation with host communities to ensure that their living conditions and public services are improved or at least not deteriorated as a result of resettlement. Effective integration strategies include promoting education and cultural orientation programs, facilitating access to job training and career counseling, and organizing community events to support new arrivals.
The relocation of Gazans to a demilitarized West Bank involves not only providing physical housing, but also integration into the existing community. Research on large-scale resettlement distinguishes between “whole-community” withdrawal, which aims to keep existing social ties intact, and “new-community” withdrawal, which involves creating a new environment in which social ties can be developed. Given the scale of displacement from Gaza, a combination of both models is likely to be necessary. Where possible, efforts should be made to resettle existing communities in order to preserve vital social networks and minimize disruption. However, for a population the size of Gaza, the creation of entirely new, large-scale planned settlements will be unavoidable. This necessitates a proactive strategy to promote social cohesion in these new “recipient” communities. This involves actively designing public spaces and programs that promote interaction and integration between the resettled populations and existing West Bank communities, rather than inadvertently creating segregated or “other” populations, which has been a challenge in other resettlement contexts. Conscious planning of community continuity and social interaction is therefore essential to reduce social segregation and promote successful integration.
4.2 Resettlement of Israeli settlers in Gaza. The relocation of Israeli settlers from the West Bank to Gaza, offered as compensation for their current properties, requires the development of new, high-quality settlements with modern infrastructure in Gaza. This presents a unique opportunity for sustainable urban planning and construction in Gaza, potentially incorporating climate-resilient designs and advanced infrastructure solutions from the outset. This approach can transform the reconstruction effort into a model of modern, sustainable development.
Like the resettlement of the Gazan population, the planning of these new Israeli communities in Gaza must involve extensive consultation to understand their specific needs and preferences. While these will largely be “new communities” formed by the relocated settlers, promoting social cohesion in these settlements and ensuring their integration into the broader UN-administered Gaza framework will be essential for long-term stability.
The relocation of Israeli settlers to Gaza, combined with the extensive need to rebuild Gaza after the conflict, presents an unparalleled opportunity for large-scale, planned and sustainable urban development. Existing research highlights how spontaneous, unplanned urbanization often leads to inadequate infrastructure and exacerbates inequality. Rather than simply replacing damaged infrastructure, UNTAG can leverage this resettlement to implement groundbreaking sustainable urban planning practices. This includes designing smart cities, integrating renewable energy solutions, implementing efficient water management systems, and creating abundant green spaces. Such a proactive approach could transform Gaza into a beacon of post-conflict reconstruction and environmental sustainability, potentially attracting additional international investment, and demonstrating the tangible benefits of the peace plan. Strategic, sustainable urban planning for these new settlements could lead to improved quality of life, increased environmental resilience, and greater economic attractiveness in Gaza.
4.3 Challenges of Mass Displacement and Mitigation Strategies. Large-scale forced displacement inevitably leads to significant challenges, including the potential loss of cultural heritage and identity. When communities are displaced, they often lose access to their ancestral lands, cultural sites and traditional customs, resulting in a profound disconnection from their cultural heritage and psychological trauma. Cultural heritage, both tangible and intangible, is directly threatened by emergencies and displacement.
To mitigate these impacts, the plan must incorporate robust strategies for cultural preservation. UNESCO advocates documenting and protecting cultural practices, supporting displaced communities in continuing their traditions in new environments, and influencing policies for the protection of cultural heritage.
The experience of forced displacement is inherently traumatic. Therefore, the plan must include comprehensive psychosocial support services for all displaced populations, with particular attention to vulnerable groups such as children and the elderly. These services should be easily accessible and culturally sensitive.
Fundamentally, all resettlement efforts must comply with international human rights standards and ensure security of tenure, availability of essential services, affordability, habitability and cultural adequacy of new housing. The principle that forced resettlement should be avoided wherever possible is paramount, and where unavoidable, all affected persons should receive full and fair compensation for lost assets.
The inquiry emphasizes “new life and housing” for Gazans and “new settlements” for Israeli settlers. However, large-scale displacement affects much more than just physical housing; it profoundly disrupts social networks, livelihoods and cultural identity. Simply building new housing without addressing these deeper impacts can lead to persistent inequalities and social segregation. Therefore, UNTAG’s plan must adopt a holistic approach that prioritizes rebuilding the social fabric and preserving cultural identity. This involves not only the provision of housing, but also comprehensive social integration programs, including the establishment of community centers, the organization of cultural festivals, the implementation of mentoring programs, and the creation of opportunities for cultural sharing. For displaced Gazans, this means actively supporting the transfer and re-establishment of their social structures and cultural practices in the West Bank. For Israeli settlers, this means promoting the creation of new communities that foster a strong sense of belonging and integrate harmoniously with the broader administrative framework of Gaza. This holistic planning, which takes into account social and cultural dimensions, is essential for the successful long-term integration and overall well-being of the resettled populations.
5. Property Compensation and Land Allocatnion. 

5.1 International Law Principles of Compensation. Under international law, the principle of full compensation dictates that compensation for damage caused by internationally wrongful acts aims to “eliminate all the consequences of the wrongful act and to re-establish the situation which would in all probability have existed if the act had not been committed”. This fundamental principle, formulated in the Chorzów Factory case, and reflected in Article 31 of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility, requires full compensation for damage, encompassing both material and moral damage.
The scope of compensation is intended to cover any economically assessable loss, including lost profits, provided that such loss is reimbursable and directly caused by the wrongful act. It is crucial to note that compensation under international law is solely compensatory and not punitive in nature. While the user query describes a negotiated population transfer rather than a direct consequence of an internationally wrongful act, the underlying principles of just and full compensation for property are paramount. These principles must be strictly applied to ensure justice and prevent future grievances for both Gazans moving to the West Bank and Israeli settlers moving to Gaza.
The inquiry states that Gazans are “offered a new life and housing”, implying a voluntary relocation, while Israeli settlers are “offered new settlements/housing … as compensation”. International law on compensation primarily deals with damages resulting from “internationally wrongful acts”. However, large-scale population transfers, even when phrased as “offers” or “compensation”, may inherently contain statutory elements of necessity or indirect coercion, making the distinction between “lawful” and “illegal” expropriation complex in practice. To ensure the legitimacy and long-term success of this plan, the compensation framework must aim for the standard of “full compensation” as if it were dealing with an internationally wrongful act, rather than simply meeting minimum legal requirements for “lawful” acquisitions (which typically only cover fair market value). This means that compensation should go beyond the mere value of the property to address indirect losses, disruption of livelihoods and potential moral damage. The lack of compensation that is perceived as “adequate” or “fair” can trigger significant conflict and resistance, even as the monetary value of the compensation increases. Therefore, a comprehensive and generous approach to compensation is a crucial factor in mitigating future disputes and securing support for the plan.
5.2 Mechanisms for property claims and restitution. The establishment of an independent and impartial Property Claims Commission is essential to resolve the myriad property disputes that will arise from the proposed population transfers. This commission would operate in a similar way to bodies established in post-conflict situations, such as the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees (CRPC) in Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Housing and Property Directorate/Complaints Commission (HPD/HPCC), later the Kosovo Property Agency (KPA), in Kosovo. Its mandate would include receiving, registering and processing real property claims.
Lessons from previous case studies are instructive:
• Bosnia’s CRPC: The CRPC was initially overwhelmed by the sheer volume of applications (over 200,000 properties were claimed) and lacked a clear enforcement mandate, which significantly hampered its effectiveness. Local authorities often resisted enforcing eviction orders, especially those against minority returns, demonstrating how property issues can become deeply sensitive political issues.
• Kosovo’s HPD/KPA: These bodies were established by UNMIK and were mandated to resolve conflict-related claims over residential, agricultural, and commercial property. However, they faced challenges, including illegal reoccupation of properties, inaccurate physical registrations, and obstacles to the registration of property hiding places by successful claimants.
• Colombia’s Land Restitution Law: This law established judicial and administrative mechanisms and a land registry that benefited over 300,000 people. However, it faced significant challenges related to the lack of security for land claimants and restitution officers, the persistence of illegal armed groups and land grabbers, and limitations in institutional capacity and coordination.
• Kenya’s Community Land Act: This law sets a positive example by recognizing and protecting community land rights, creating a legal framework for registration, and empowering communities in decision-making over their ancestral lands.
While the establishment of a litigation commission is a necessary initial step, historical examples consistently show that property issues are deeply political and can be primary causes of recurrent conflicts. Local political elites may actively oppose restitution efforts if they perceive them as undermining their power bases. The process can be further hampered by the lack of security for claimants and officials, as well as the persistence of illegal groups involved in land grabbing. UNTAG must therefore anticipate and proactively address the political economy of property. This requires not only a robust legal framework, but also strong enforcement mechanisms, potentially backed by UN security forces, to address resistance and ensure compliance. Significant investment in institutional capacity and coordination will be essential. In addition, the claims handling process must be transparent and actively involve community participation to build trust and legitimacy, thereby reducing the risk of future disputes.
5.3 Establishing a fair and transparent compensation framework. A transparent and equitable compensation framework is essential for a successful population transfer. Compensation should be based on objective and transparent valuation methods that ideally reflect a fair market value and cover all economically assessable damages, potentially including lost profits. A clear, standardized approach to valuation is essential to avoid perceptions of unfairness or inequality, which, as observed in China, can fuel conflict even as compensation amounts increase.
In addition to the Compensation Commission, accessible and effective alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, such as mediation and arbitration, should be established to resolve property disputes. These methods can be more cost-effective and time-saving than traditional litigation, and they can contribute to maintaining more positive relations between the parties to the dispute, which is crucial in a sensitive post-conflict environment.
The request specifically calls for compensation for Israeli settler property in the West Bank. The experience of China shows that even an increase in compensation can lead to more conflict if changes in compensation standards are perceived as unequal across different regions. Transparency in decision-making processes has consistently been shown to build trust. Therefore, the compensation framework for both Gazans and Israeli settlers must be communicated with the utmost clarity and consistency to all affected parties. Transparent property valuation and grievance processes are essential. Any perceived inequality or lack of clarity can undermine trust and create new grievances, potentially fueling social tensions between different resettled groups or between resettled groups and host communities. This underlines the need for independent oversight and clear grievance procedures to ensure that the compensation process is not only fair in principle, but also perceived as fair by those affected.
5.4 Land registration and security of tenure under UN supervision. The establishment of a modern, comprehensive and accurate land registry for both Gaza and the West Bank is essential for long-term stability and economic development. This digital system would meticulously record and verify all ownership and use rights to land, thus providing a clear basis for future transactions and investments.
Conflict often brings about dynamic changes in land distribution and management systems, complicating land tenure and leading to the emergence of secondary occupants. The new land policy must adopt a “contextualized ‘systems’ approach” rather than relying solely on universalized “rights-based models” for property restitution. This approach is necessary to effectively address complex customary tenure systems and informal land arrangements that may exist. This involves recognizing and formalizing existing customary land arrangements where relevant, and ensuring that the new system is inclusive and respects traditional rights.
Securing tenure rights to new sites is essential. UNTAG must guarantee clear title to all affected households and businesses, free from additional registration fees, licensing fees or customary levies. Special provisions are also needed for vulnerable groups, such as female households, whose land rights may not be fully recognized or protected under traditional local laws or customs.
Land tenure issues are often a primary cause of recurrent conflict. Secure land tenure is therefore essential for nation-building and the prevention of future conflict. The establishment of a robust and inclusive land tenure system under UN supervision is not simply an administrative or technical task; it is a fundamental peacebuilding requirement. By clearly defining and securing property rights for all populations involved in the transfers, and by recognizing diverse forms of tenure (including customary rights), UNTAG can mitigate a significant source of potential future conflict. Furthermore, a stable and transparent land tenure system provides a crucial foundation for economic investment and reconstruction, as businesses need clear and secure property rights to operate and grow. This secure and inclusive land tenure system will contribute significantly to reducing land disputes and improving long-term peace and economic development.
6. Economic reconstruction and sustainable development. 

6.1 Post-conflict Economic Recovery Strategy for Gaza and the West Bank. Post-conflict economic recovery is a complex, holistic and multidimensional process that aims to achieve sustainable socio-economic development in war-torn regions. For Gaza and the West Bank, this involves not only restoring physical infrastructure, but also re-establishing social services and creating an environment conducive to private sector development. The strategy should prioritize key sectors that are capable of driving rapid recovery and long-term growth.
Agriculture is crucial for food security and rural livelihoods, especially in regions with a history of agricultural activity. Implementing sustainable agricultural practices, such as crop rotation, organic farming and precision agriculture, can improve soil health, reduce water use and minimize environmental impacts, while contributing to food security. For example, Rwanda’s post-genocide economic plan has successfully focused on climate-smart agriculture to improve food production and attract private investment, demonstrating the potential of this sector.
Industrial reconstruction should focus on rebuilding and diversifying the industrial base. This includes light manufacturing and export-oriented industries, which are crucial for job creation and overall economic growth. Efforts should target sustainable cooperative business development and the encouragement of new local self-sufficient enterprises.
The service sector, including the digital economy, tourism and financial services, can contribute significantly to GDP and employment, especially as infrastructure is restored and stability increases. Investment in education and skills development will be crucial to support growth in these areas.
Conflict-affected states are almost three times more likely to relapse into conflict within five years. Economic decline and high unemployment often act as significant drivers of conflict and provide fertile ground for renewed instability. Conversely, the creation of robust economic opportunities significantly reduces the risk of a resurgence of conflict. Therefore, the Economic Recovery Plan for Gaza and the West Bank must be seen as an integral and fundamental part of the broader peacebuilding strategy. Rapid job creation, especially for youth and individuals demobilized through DDR programs, and rapid restoration of livelihoods are essential to build confidence in the peace process and prevent a return to war, violence and instability. Prioritizing sectors that can quickly generate employment and provide tangible benefits to the population will be key to demonstrating the success and viability of the new peace state.
6.2 Promoting private sector engagement and investment. Attracting and sustaining investment is essential for long-term economic growth and self-sufficiency. This requires creating an enabling environment characterized by stability, predictability, robust legal and regulatory frameworks, strong protection of property rights, and low levels of corruption. Economic recovery will require significant direct investment, underscoring the importance of streamlined business procedures and investment incentives committed to fostering a fair investment climate.
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) can play a crucial role in mobilizing capital for infrastructure development and increasing efficiency in service delivery, particularly in post-conflict states where public funds are often limited and needs are enormous.
PPPs can help overcome cycles of low investment and low productivity by leveraging private sector innovation and efficiency. In a fair investment climate, the economic majority over critical infrastructure must always be in the favor of society.
While attracting private investment is essential for economic growth, a one-sided focus on large infrastructure projects can inadvertently exacerbate social inequalities and lead to the displacement of low-income communities if not managed carefully. The overarching goal is not just economic growth, but inclusive growth. Therefore, UNTAG must design investment policies that not only attract capital but also ensure broad-based benefits, widespread job creation and equal access to opportunities for all segments of the population. This means prioritizing investments that support local businesses, foster the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and finance vocational training programs that are in line with the needs of emerging markets. Investment incentives should be carefully structured to promote responsible business conduct and actively avoid exacerbating existing inequalities. This inclusive engagement by the private sector is essential to achieve equitable economic development and reduce social inequalities.
6.3 The role of international financial institutions and aid organizations. Effective post-conflict recovery requires a strongly coordinated approach between humanitarian, development and peace actors. The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (HDPN), conceptualized at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, provides a common framework for integrating these efforts to address the root causes of instability and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Roles of key actors:
• World Bank: The World Bank focuses on long-term economic development, poverty reduction and infrastructure development. It provides technical and financial support for reforms and projects and plays a crucial role in rebuilding physical infrastructure and in fostering the conditions for private sector growth.
• International Monetary Fund (IMF): The IMF promotes global macroeconomic and financial stability. It provides policy advice and short- to medium-term loans to countries experiencing balance of payments problems, helping to stabilize economies and restore confidence.
• UN agencies (UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF): These organizations provide a wide range of humanitarian assistance, including food, shelter, health, education and protection. They also support long-term development, capacity-building and social inclusion initiatives. UNHCR specifically supports displaced persons and refugees. UNDP focuses on combating poverty, inequality and climate change.
• Non-governmental organizations (NGOs): NGOs play a crucial role in providing rapid humanitarian assistance and implementing long-term development projects, including infrastructure development, education and job creation. They are essential for rebuilding communities and often have existing networks to deliver aid effectively to marginalized populations.
A strong coordination mechanism, potentially led by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), is essential to ensure coherence of response and avoid duplication of efforts. This coordination should include joint conflict analysis, strategic planning and the implementation of flexible, multi-year funding mechanisms.
The World Bank, while not a traditional aid agency, plays a crucial role in bridging the gap between immediate humanitarian assistance and long-term development. Historical challenges show that humanitarian assistance is often isolated from development and peace efforts, leading to inefficiencies and missed opportunities for sustainable recovery. In Gaza, the immediate humanitarian crisis will inevitably transition into a long-term development phase. UNTAG must proactively manage this transition and ensure that humanitarian interventions are designed from the outset as a bridge to sustainable development. This requires early and ongoing coordination between humanitarian actors (UN agencies, NGOs) and development partners (World Bank, IMF, private sector) to ensure that immediate assistance supports long-term recovery goals and avoids creating new dependencies. This effective coordination across the HDPN is essential for a smooth transition from relief to sustainable development and peacebuilding.
6.4 Environmental Sustainability and Resource Management. Integrating environmental sustainability into all aspects of the development plan is essential for Gaza’s long-term survival, prosperity and well-being. Environmental sustainability encompasses resource conservation, biodiversity conservation and waste and emissions reduction, with the aim of meeting current needs without compromising the ability of future generations to thrive.
Rapid urbanization and unplanned development often lead to inadequate infrastructure and environmental degradation, exacerbating inequalities and limiting access to basic services for vulnerable populations. In addition, climate change is intensifying displacement and affecting resource availability, posing significant challenges to sustainable development.
Key strategies for environmental sustainability include:
• Implementing sustainable resource management practices for water, land, forests and minerals, ensuring their efficient and responsible use.
• Prioritizing climate-resilient infrastructure and urban planning for all new and rebuilt settlements.
• Promoting green jobs, circular economies and sustainable agricultural practices (e.g. crop rotation, organic farming) to foster economic growth while minimising environmental impacts.
• Conducting thorough environmental risk assessments for all new development projects, particularly in resettlement areas.
The plan should also take into account the impact of population displacement on cultural heritage. Climate change and displacement threaten both tangible (e.g. sites, artefacts) and intangible (e.g. traditions, language, knowledge) cultural heritage. Local communities often hold invaluable traditional knowledge on heritage conservation, and this knowledge should be actively integrated into environmental planning and reconstruction efforts.
For Gaza and the West Bank, particularly given the large population movements, integrating environmental sustainability is not just an ecological issue but a fundamental social and economic imperative. Unplanned urbanization and lack of adequate infrastructure can lead to significant inequality and limit access to basic services for the poorest segments of the population. Environmental degradation and resource scarcity can further exacerbate existing social tensions and lead to further displacement. Therefore, ensuring access to clean water, reliable energy and healthy living environments through sustainable practices will directly contribute to improved public health, reduce social inequality and mitigate future conflicts over scarce resources. This requires robust environmental impact assessments for all development projects and a steadfast commitment to “green” reconstruction principles. Proactive environmental sustainability and resource management are essential for improved public health, reduced social inequality and increased long-term stability.
7. Long-term stability and the path to independence (after grade 14)
7.1 Framework for negotiating self-determination and independence. The proposed 14-year UN control period is designed to lay the foundation for Gaza’s eventual self-determination and independence. Traditional demands for self-determination are often presented as “all-or-nothing” proposals, which can lead to protracted and destructive conflicts. The future of Gaza’s approach to self-determination should be aimed at an independent “peace state” from the very beginning of the 14-year period.
During the 14-year UN control period, UNTAG must actively promote a legitimate and inclusive political process. This includes building robust democratic institutions, ensuring multi-ethnic representation in all governance structures, and consistently promoting human rights. The goal is to cultivate a political landscape capable of self-governance and negotiation.
The request specifies that “independence be negotiated every 5 years” after the initial approximately 14-year period, implying a deferred substantive agreement. The challenge is to ensure that this delay is productive rather than a source of renewed conflict. The 14-year period should be explicitly framed as a time for the development of robust, self-governing institutions within a framework of substantial autonomy, thus paving the way for future negotiations. This means empowering local legislative, executive and judicial bodies to gradually assume full responsibility for internal affairs, while the UN retains oversight of the demilitarized status and external relations. This phased approach, which focuses on building “standards before status”, but with genuine local ownership, can establish a credible track record of successful self-governance, making future independence negotiations more feasible and less controversial. This successful development of autonomous self-governance is therefore crucial to increasing the viability and legitimacy of future independence negotiations.
7.2 Mechanisms for periodic review and adjustment (every 5 years). The periodic independence negotiations every five years after the initial approx. The 14-year period requires a structured framework for review and adjustment. Future negotiations should be based on clear, mutually agreed benchmarks. These benchmarks should include the stability and effectiveness of government institutions, the degree of economic self-sufficiency achieved, consistent compliance with demilitarization provisions, human rights statistics, and regional cooperation promoted.
The review process should be inclusive and involve representatives of the Gaza Democratically Elected Administration, the West Bank Democratically Elected Administration, and the UN in collaboration with international actors. Effective stakeholder engagement, sustained over time, is essential to build trust and legitimacy in the process. This ongoing dialogue helps ensure that all parties remain committed to the long-term vision. The periodic review mechanism also allows for flexibility and adjustment of the governance model based on documented progress and evolving circumstances, preventing adherence to rigid, predetermined parameters that may not reflect the realities on the ground.
While periodic negotiations aim to create a clear path to independence, frequent or inconclusive negotiations can lead to “negotiation fatigue” and frustration, potentially undermining the entire peace process. To prevent this, each five-year review should have clear, defined objectives and a precise scope, focusing on concrete progress and incremental steps towards self-determination. Benchmarks for negotiations should be realistic and achievable, demonstrating continuous movement towards the ultimate goal of independence. The role of the United Nations in these negotiations would be crucial for impartial mediation and the promotion of constructive dialogue. Clear objectives and demonstrable progress in periodic reviews are essential to sustain political will and reduce negotiation fatigue.
7.3 Ensuring continued regional stability and international support. Even after the formal transition to UN administration, an ongoing international presence will be necessary to ensure long-term stability. This presence will provide institutional guidance to local police, judiciary and bureaucratic structures and offer ongoing financial and social support. This continued engagement may also necessitate the redeployment of international forces for stabilisation purposes if significant challenges or threats to peace arise.
Regional cooperation is essential for lasting stability. For example, the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia has been seen as crucial for stability in the Western Balkans. Similarly, sustained cooperation and normalised relations between the new Gaza entity, the West Bank and Israel are essential for regional peace and security.
International financial institutions (e.g. World Bank, IMF) and UN agencies/NGOs should commit to providing long-term financial and technical assistance for economic development, infrastructure projects and the provision of social services. This ongoing support is essential for building resilience and ensuring the self-sufficiency of the new entity.
The World Bank’s post-conflict framework emphasizes the principle of “doing no harm” and actively avoiding exacerbating existing inequalities. Continued international engagement, if not managed carefully, can inadvertently create dependencies or distort local economies. Therefore, long-term international support must strategically shift from direct service delivery to capacity building and facilitation, enabling local institutions to take the lead in their own development. This means investing significantly in local human resources and institution building to improve capacity to design and implement effective policies. The focus should be on strengthening local ownership and resilience and ensuring that international assistance promotes genuine self-reliance rather than perpetuating dependency. This assistance, which focuses on local capacity building and ownership, is essential for sustainable development and reduced long-term dependency.
8. Conclusion and Key Recommendations. The proposed Gaza Development Plan, which envisions a demilitarized, UN-administered peace state with reciprocal population transfer, presents an extraordinarily complex but potentially transformative path to peace. Its success depends on a careful and multifaceted approach that integrates security, governance, humanitarian concerns, economic development and social cohesion.
Key Recommendations:
1. Adopt a robust UN Chapter VII mandate: The UN Security Council should approve a Chapter VII mandate for UNTAG that provides the necessary authority and robust use of force to ensure comprehensive demilitarization and maintain a secure environment from the outset. This model is essential given the inherent security challenges and the lack of clear territorial consent.
2. Prioritize people-centered security sector reform: Gaza’s success as a demilitarized state depends entirely on a legitimate and effective civilian police force. UNTAG must prioritize building this capacity through a people-centred SSR approach that emphasizes local policing, human rights training and transparent accountability mechanisms, and that promotes deep local ownership rather than external imposition.
3. Implement comprehensive and integrated DDR: A robust disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme is an essential prerequisite. This programme must be fully integrated with economic development initiatives and provide viable living conditions and psychosocial support to former combatants to prevent remilitarisation and ensure long-term stability.
4. Implement humane and planned resettlement of populations: The large-scale population transfers require careful planning of new, comprehensively designed settlements in both the West Bank and Gaza. This includes ensuring adequate infrastructure, addressing affordability and accessibility challenges, and actively promoting social cohesion in new and host communities through cultural exchange programmes and community-building initiatives. It is crucial to prioritize the preservation of cultural heritage and provide comprehensive psychosocial support to all displaced populations.              5. Establish a transparent and equitable framework for property compensation: An independent property claims commission should be established, drawing on lessons learned from previous experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo, with clear enforcement mechanisms. Compensation should adhere to the principle of full compensation, cover all assessable damages, and be communicated with the greatest possible transparency to prevent new complaints and foster trust.
6. Create a modern, inclusive land registry: A digital, comprehensive land registry for both Gaza and the West Bank is essential for long-term stability and economic development. This system should adopt a contextualized approach to land tenure that recognizes and formalizes customary and informal rights to mitigate future disputes and provide a stable foundation for investment.
7. Promote inclusive economic reconstruction: The economic recovery strategy should be seen as a key peace-building mechanism, focusing on rapid job creation and the restoration of livelihoods in key sectors (agriculture, industry, services). Encouraging private sector engagement through an enabling environment and public-private partnerships (PPPs) is essential, but policies must ensure inclusive growth that benefits all segments of the population and avoids exacerbating inequalities.
8. Ensure coordinated international support (HDPN): International financial institutions (World Bank, IMF) and UN agencies/NGOs should coordinate their efforts through the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (HDPN). This ensures a smooth transition from immediate relief to sustainable development, with assistance strategically focused on building local capacity and ownership to promote self-reliance rather than maintaining dependency.
9. Cultivate a phased path to independence: The 14-year UN review period should be used to build robust, autonomous, self-governing institutions that prepare for future negotiations. Periodic reviews every five years should have clear objectives and demonstrate tangible progress towards self-determination, sustain political will and prevent negotiation fatigue.
10. Maintain long-term regional engagement: Even after formal UN administration, an ongoing international presence for institutional guidance and sustained financial and technical assistance is essential. This, combined with ongoing dialogue and confidence-building measures between the new Gaza entity, the West Bank, and Israel, is essential to ensure lasting regional stability and prevent a return to conflict.
The successful implementation of this plan requires unprecedented international political will, sustained financial commitment, and a flexible and adaptable approach that prioritizes local ownership and human dignity. While the challenges are immense, the potential to transform Gaza into a beacon of peace and prosperity for the region justifies such a comprehensive and focused effort.

Summary: A Vision for a New Gaza: 
This report outlines a strategic framework for the proposed transformation of Gaza into a demilitarized, UN-administered state. The vision focuses on establishing a secure environment, promoting legitimate governance, promoting sustainable development, and achieving comprehensive social inclusion. This new paradigm is presented as a critical path to achieving lasting peace and prosperity in a region long plagued by conflict. Drawing on lessons from various post-conflict transitions, the proposed model emphasizes the need for a robust international presence, genuine local ownership, and integrated cross-sectoral interventions to build a resilient and self-sustaining society.
1. Introduction: From Conflict to a Land of Peace
Defining the Vision for a New Gaza. The concept of “New Gaza” envisions a future that is fundamentally different from its conflict-ridden past. It is articulated as a demilitarized, UN-administered entity that is carefully reoriented toward the fundamental principles of peace, sustainable development, and inclusive social inclusion. This vision moves beyond traditional, often reactive, approaches to conflict resolution and instead advocates proactive and comprehensive state-building efforts. Such a transformation would necessitate a complete cessation of hostilities, the establishment of robust security mechanisms, and the cultivation of a civilian-led secular society focused on long-term stability and human well-being, grounded in a philosophical stance that combines rationalism, humanism, and agnosticism.
The imperative for a new paradigm in post-conflict reconstruction
The history of post-conflict interventions globally reveals a complex landscape of successes and significant limitations. Traditional approaches, often fragmented and short-sighted, have often failed to address the underlying causes of instability or foster genuine self-reliance. The complexity of post-conflict environments, characterized by damaged infrastructure, displaced populations, and fractured social structures, requires an integrated and adaptable strategy. The key for New Gaza is to learn from these past experiences and move beyond temporary solutions to implement a holistic framework that builds lasting peace and sustainable prosperity. This requires a shift from conventional interventions towards a comprehensive, multidimensional reconstruction effort that prioritizes long-term resilience and local empowerment.
2. Establishing a Demilitarized and Secure Environment. Concepts of Demilitarization. Demilitarized zones (DMZs) are defined as specific geographic areas where military presence, activities, and infrastructure are either completely prohibited or significantly reduced. These zones are typically established through international agreements or treaties and are often monitored by international organizations or third-party observers. The fundamental purpose of a DMZ is to de-escalate tensions, prevent the recurrence of conflicts, and create neutral spaces conducive to negotiation and diplomacy.
Historical precedents provide valuable insight into the implementation and challenges of DMZs. The Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), established in 1953 after the Korean War, serves as a prominent example. This zone extends approximately 250 kilometers in length and is about 4 kilometers wide. Although the zone itself is demilitarized, its borders are among the most heavily fortified globally, with significant troop concentrations on both sides. Soldiers are permitted to patrol within the DMZ, but crossing the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) is strictly prohibited. Interestingly, there are “peace villages” within the Korean DMZ, where residents live under the direction and protection of the United Nations Command and enjoy certain civil exemptions.
Another relevant example is the Demilitarized Zone in the Sinai Peninsula, which was established as a key provision of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. This agreement demarcated four distinct security zones across the peninsula, each with specific restrictions on military forces and equipment. The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), an independent international organization, was established in 1981 to monitor the implementation of these security arrangements. The MFO’s continued success over four decades is largely attributed to its agile, adaptable and impartial approach, which includes a robust liaison system that fosters trust and mutual confidence between the parties to the treaty. The MFO also assumes responsibility for monitoring the Egyptian Border Guard forces along the Gaza border, as agreed between the parties.
For New Gaza, images showing clear, monitored buffer zones with a visible UN presence would be illustrative. These visual elements could highlight the demarcation line, strategically placed observation posts and UN civilian vehicles patrolling the area, thereby highlighting the demilitarized status and transparent international supervision.
Security protocols and monitoring mechanisms
The effectiveness of any demilitarized zone depends on robust security protocols and ongoing monitoring mechanisms. In the Korean Demilitarized Zone, for example, the UN Military Armistice Commission is responsible for monitoring. Similarly, the MFO in Sinai employs a dedicated civilian observer unit to regularly verify military deployments and a legal team to identify any violations of the treaty. Their findings are reported confidentially and impartially to both parties, a practice that has cultivated trust and reliance over time. The continued success of the Sinai MFO over four decades underscores a crucial understanding: long-term security is not solely a function of physical demilitarization or advanced technological surveillance. Its sustainability is deeply rooted in its agile, adaptable and flexible operational model, combined with its enduring ability to build trust and mutual confidence through an effective connectivity system and impartial observations. This indicates that establishing genuine, lasting security goes beyond mere physical barriers and surveillance technology. It requires a sophisticated diplomatic and liaison framework that actively cultivates trust between all relevant parties. The role of the UN in such a context must go beyond passive observation to actively promote continuous dialogue and ensure unwavering impartiality in its monitoring activities. This comprehensive approach is essential to maintaining long-term stability and effectively preventing any escalation of conflict.
Although excerpts about “network DMZs” refer to cybersecurity, their underlying principles of layered defense, continuous surveillance and strict access control offer valuable analogies to physical security protocols in a demilitarized zone. These concepts can be adapted to create a multi-layered physical security architecture that ensures that the demilitarized status is not only established but rigorously maintained through constant vigilance and controlled access.
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
Successful post-war peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts are fundamentally contingent on the comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. The process is inherently complex and, if not managed effectively, can undermine the very stability it seeks to achieve.
Experiences from Timor-Leste highlight the significant challenges associated with DDR, particularly when it comes to armed groups that may be informal or operate clandestinely. The lack of clear structures or registers for such groups complicates identification, demobilization and subsequent reintegration efforts. If these challenges are not adequately addressed, they can leave a threat to peace.
The situation in South Sudan is a stark example of the consequences when DDR and security sector reform (SSR) processes lack genuine commitment and support from the host state. The inadequate support from the government contributed significantly to the collapse of the nascent state, leading to a resurgence of violence and persistent instability. This demonstrates that DDR is not simply a technical military exercise, but a profound political and social undertaking. It involves transforming individuals from combatants to productive citizens, which requires addressing their underlying grievances, economic needs and pathways to social integration. Without an effective DDR programme, former combatants may return to armed activity, thereby undermining any progress in governance or economic development.
For New Gaza, a comprehensive DDR programme must be a central and non-negotiable part of the transition. This program must be carefully tailored to the specific context of armed groups in Gaza and move beyond top-down imposition to truly understand and address the motivations that may lead to continued armed engagement. This involves a strategy that offers viable economic alternatives, vocational training, and essential psychosocial support to former combatants. Furthermore, it must provide clear pathways to political and social inclusion and ensure that these individuals can become contributing members of the new society. The success of such a DDR initiative will directly impact the viability of any future local authority in Gaza, as a legitimate and stable government cannot emerge and flourish in the continued presence of uncontrolled armed factions.
3. The UN-Administered State: Governance and Transition Models of UN Transitional Administrations.

The UN has a well-documented history of directly administering territories, a role distinct from its traditional peacekeeping or trust territory mandates. Historical examples include the United Nations Interim Executive Authority (UNTEA) in West New Guinea, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). These administrations generally fall into three broad models, each with different advantages and challenges.
The first model is the UNGA Interim Executive Authority (UNTEA). This was a short-lived mission, lasting only seven months, and was authorized by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Its primary role was to oversee the transfer of sovereignty and administration of West New Guinea from the Netherlands to Indonesia, based on an existing agreement between these two states. A key advantage of this model is its ability to circumvent potential vetoes by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). However, its limitations include a limited mandate for the use of force, primarily in self-defense, and the requirement for prior agreement between the parties involved. For Gaza, the absence of such an existing agreement and the need for robust security arrangements would present significant challenges to a UNTEA-like model.
The second model is the UN Security Council Chapter VI transitional administration, exemplified by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (1992–1995). UNTAC, mandated under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, was established to implement a peace agreement and organize elections for a new Cambodian government. This model requires the “consent” of a recognized or purported sovereign body within the territory. While UNTAC’s focus on preparing and administering free and fair elections is relevant, its rules on the use of force during disarmament and ceasefire enforcement were found to be “wholly inadequate”. For Gaza, the establishment of an interim sovereign representative body may encounter political obstacles, and the need for robust force capabilities to deal with armed groups would make a Chapter VI mandate inadequate.
The third and most robust model is the UN Security Council’s Chapter VII transitional administration, with historical examples including UNTAES (Eastern Slavonia), UNMIK (Kosovo) and UNTAET (East Timor). This model is particularly relevant to New Gaza because of its inherent strengths. A primary advantage is the absence of a legal requirement for the consent of the territorial state to deployment and mandate. This is crucially beneficial for Gaza, where it is currently unclear which state(s) are responsible for the territory. Furthermore, Chapter VII mandates allow for robust use of force capabilities, allowing for “all necessary means” for mandate enforcement and combat operations, which is essential for withdrawal, disarmament of armed groups, or dealing with disaffected groups. This model gives the Transitional Administrator and the mission greater freedom of action, as they report directly to the UN Security Council and the Secretary-General rather than being constrained by the consent of local entities. The mandate can also be easily developed by the UN Security Council, providing a flexibility unmatched by other models.
The current context in Gaza, characterized by unclear responsible authority and the likely necessity of withdrawal, disarmament of armed groups, or dealing with disaffected factions, indicates that a Chapter VII mandate is the most logical and effective choice. This model explicitly removes the legal requirement for territorial consent and provides the necessary authority for robust use of force, which is essential for establishing and maintaining security in a highly volatile environment. Therefore, a UN transitional administration in Gaza would require a Chapter VII mandate from the Security Council to overcome potential political obstacles and security challenges. This robust mandate would enable the UN to act decisively to establish law and order, disarm groups, and build basic governance structures without being paralyzed by the lack of consent of entrenched or fragmented local actors or by the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement from the outset. Although not legally required, consultation with relevant states (Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, the Arab League) is a sensible initial step to build regional support.
Establishing Legitimate Governance Structures
UN transitional administrations typically undertake the complex task of establishing interim administrations, civilian administrations, police forces, and judicial systems, alongside efforts to build capacity for self-governance. The approach that the UN has taken in previous missions, notably in the East Timor (UNTAET) and Kosovo (UNMIK), has revealed significant challenges in fostering genuine legitimacy.
In both UNTAET and UNMIK, the UN often adopted a “nation-building” approach that often disregarded existing local power structures and notions of legitimacy. This involved imposing Western rational-legal models of government, often through elections, in the belief that these would confer legitimacy. However, this top-down imposition often led to a “crisis of legitimacy” due to local dissatisfaction with their subordinate roles and a lack of real ownership of the newly created institutions. For example, UNMIK’s initial structure included pillars for civil administration, police and judiciary, democratization and institution building (led by the OSCE), and reconstruction and economic development (led by the EU). Although it established a multi-ethnic Kosovo Police Service and initially had legislative, executive and judicial authority, implementing these structures proved problematic without deep local integration.
Similarly, in East Timor, UNTAET established a National Consultative Council (NCC) to involve local leaders, but ultimate power remained with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). The re-establishment of a justice system faced enormous obstacles due to a severe lack of qualified staff and capacity, leading to a “culture of impunity” and reliance on customary law. The introduction of new administrative structures, which sometimes replaced traditional leaders with younger, qualified but locally illegitimate officials, further fractured East Timorese society.
A fundamental lesson from these experiences is that genuine legitimacy for governance is an endogenous process that cannot be effectively enforced or imposed by external actors. The continued need for international guidance in both East Timor and Kosovo years after the initial UN effort underscores this point. For New Gaza, this means that it is not enough to simply copy external models. The process must be deeply rooted in the local context and actively involve the population in shaping their future governance.
To visually represent this new, impartial government authority, images of modern, transparent UN administration buildings could be used, perhaps with the UN flag prominently displayed according to protocol. These visual elements, along with images of civilian UN vehicles, would symbolize the presence of international support and a new era of governance.
Phased withdrawal and capacity building
Even after a UN transitional administration formally hands over authority to a new local government, an ongoing international presence remains essential. This continued engagement is essential for institutional guidance, particularly in critical sectors such as the police, judiciary and bureaucracy, and for providing sustained economic and social support. The transition process is rarely a clean break, but rather a phased withdrawal, with international support being adjusted to the evolving capacities of the nascent state.
In Kosovo, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) transferred government authority to local institutions in 2008. Despite this transfer, UNMIK maintains a smaller presence focused on promoting peace, stability and human rights, while the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) assumed most of the rule of law functions. This ongoing, albeit recalibrated, international engagement highlights the long-term nature of capacity-building and institutional strengthening.
Similarly, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was abolished upon East Timor’s independence in 2002, with many functions transferred to the newly formed government and security forces to the subsequent United Nations Support Mission in East Timor (UNMISET). The continued existence of the East Timorese government, however, is attributed more to the resilience of local power structures that were reshaped into East Timorese paradigms of authority than to a full adoption of externally imposed Western democratic principles. This suggests that true sustainability often depends on the ability of local systems to adapt and integrate external support into their own frameworks.
The experience of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) further illustrates the complexity and potential pitfalls of this phase. UNMISS, which initially had a significant focus on state-building, faced significant challenges due to insufficient support from the host state and obstacles to its freedom of movement. These obstacles severely limited the mission’s ability to effectively build institutional capacity, ultimately hampering the state-building process.
The repeated challenges faced by UN missions in fully establishing legitimate and self-sustaining governments, as seen in Kosovo and East Timor, stem from a fundamental understanding: government legitimacy is an endogenous process that cannot be imposed from the outside. Top-down imposition of Western norms, as was often the case, often erodes existing societal structures and beliefs, leading to a lack of accountability and genuine ownership among the population. The relative durability of the government in East Timor, attributed to the resilience of local power structures adapted to East Timorese paradigms of authority, suggests that successful transitions are those that integrate with, rather than replace, indigenous systems.
For New Gaza, the UN administration must prioritize promoting genuine, bottom-up local ownership from the outset. This means actively identifying, consulting and empowering authentic local leaders and integrating existing community structures and cultural norms into the new governance framework, rather than attempting a “tabula rasa” approach. The phased withdrawal plan must be flexible and contingent on documented local capacity and legitimacy, rather than adhering to rigid, pre-determined timelines. A long-term commitment to mentoring and supporting local institutions is essential. Furthermore, any electoral process, when implemented, must be designed to genuinely reflect local power dynamics and build trust, ensuring that the administered population has a genuine interest in shaping their institutions after handover. This approach recognizes that sustainable peace is built on the foundation of local agency and culturally relevant institutions.
Property rights and land restitution
Armed conflicts invariably lead to profound and dynamic changes in land distribution and governance systems. During such periods, vulnerable populations are often displaced, leading to complex situations where secondary occupants may claim land tenure. This environment is ripe for exploitation by political elites consolidating control over land amid the breakdown of governance.
Land policy plays a crucial role in recovering from the effects of conflict and, most importantly, in preventing future conflict. However, land-related challenges are rarely addressed in a comprehensive manner because land is a cross-cutting issue that involves various siloed areas, including peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and development assistance. International legal paradigms regarding housing, land and property rights can further complicate the provision of effective remedies for past human rights violations. A focus on universalized rights or “best practice” models can hinder the adoption of effective land policy due to resistance from political elites or challenges related to cross-sectoral coordination and institutional capacity. Transitional justice typically focuses on the restitution of property to those who have been dispossessed during conflict or oppression, but it must also prioritize institutional reforms to prevent the recurrence of such abuses.
Case studies in property claims mechanisms:

• Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Commission for the Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees (CRPC) achieved remarkable success in returning occupied housing units, with 92% of 200,000 claims resolved within four years. However, this often resulted in the eviction of current residents, which met with fierce resistance from local authorities determined to maintain ethnic homogeneity. Reconstruction of destroyed properties (an estimated 459,000 units) was a larger, but often overlooked, problem compared to the return of occupied properties. Initially, the lack of enforcement mechanisms threatened the credibility of the CRPC.
• Kosovo: The Housing Directorate (HPD) and its successor, the Kosovo Property Agency (KPA), resolved tens of thousands of residential property claims. Despite these efforts, challenges persisted, including illegal reoccupation of properties, inaccurate physical registration, obstacles to property registration, and jurisdictional disputes with the regular courts. Many damaged properties belonging to minorities remained unaddressed, contributing to the overall low number of minorities restitutions.
• Colombia: The Law on Victims and Land Restitution, adopted in 2011, aimed to provide comprehensive reparations, including land restitution or compensation, to over 300,000 people. However, implementation faces significant challenges, such as lack of security and protection for land claimants and officials, persistent illegal armed groups and land grabbers, limited institutional capacity, and insufficient resources and political will.
• Kenya: The Community Land Act of 2016 legally recognizes and protects the rights of communities to their ancestral lands and allows them to participate in decision-making. A notable success is the Ogiek community, which after decades of evictions was granted its first community property title in 2019, setting a precedent for other communities in Kenya and Africa.
Property restitution, while a moral imperative and a tool for transitional justice, carries inherent complexities. The experience from Bosnia shows that successful restitution of occupied homes, when it involved evicting new occupants, was met with fierce resistance from local political actors seeking to perpetuate ethnic divisions. This highlights how an apparently just act can inadvertently reignite conflict if not handled with extreme care and political sensitivity. The challenges observed in Kosovo and Colombia further highlight practical issues related to enforcement, security, and the need to move beyond mere legal frameworks to address the realities of destroyed property, informal occupations, and political resistance. The “dual ownership problem,” where property may have been confiscated and then distributed or sold to new owners, is a recurring theme in post-conflict situations. 

For New Gaza, land and property restitution must be approached with the utmost caution and with a deep understanding of local dynamics and potential flashpoints. A robust and impartial compensation commission with strong enforcement mechanisms is essential. However, this must be combined with comprehensive reconstruction efforts, recognizing that the scale of destroyed properties often far exceeds the scale of occupied properties, as seen in Bosnia. Alternative housing or compensation mechanisms that minimize displacement and social disruption are also essential. Prioritizing clear, fee-free property rights is essential to create stability and prevent future disputes. The entire process should include assisted negotiation and aim to build trust and reconciliation, rather than simply imposing legal solutions that may inadvertently create new grievances. A “contextualized ‘systems’ approach” to land policy is needed that goes beyond universal “best practice” models to address the unique complexities of the Gaza context.

4. Sustainable Development: Rebuilding for a Resilient Future
Economic Reconstruction and Diversification. Post-conflict reconstruction is a multifaceted effort aimed at consolidating peace and security through sustainable socio-economic development. This comprehensive process encompasses improvements across military, political, economic and social dimensions. Key economic tasks in such settings typically include the effective distribution of relief aid, the restoration of vital physical infrastructure, the re-establishment of essential social services and the creation of an enabling environment for private sector development.
Rwanda’s post-genocide recovery is a compelling example of successful economic recovery. The strategy prioritized macroeconomic stability, economic diversification (with a focus on export promotion and services) and significant improvements in agricultural productivity, alongside a concerted effort to attract private sector investment. The country achieved an impressive GDP growth rate of 13% in 1996, driven by increased tax collection, accelerated privatization of state-owned enterprises, and a significant increase in export production of crops and food. The establishment of a “one-stop investment promotion center” and the implementation of a new investment code were crucial in creating a favorable environment for both foreign and local investors. The agricultural sector, which is crucial for food security and overall economic growth, is now experiencing plans for climate-smart agriculture, which are expected to attract significant private investment.
Sierra Leone’s post-war reconstruction is also showing significant progress. With strong support from the government and the international community, efforts focused on rebuilding state institutions, restoring basic services, and promoting economic growth and employment. Achievements included the successful disarmament and reintegration of former combatants, the resettlement of displaced populations, and the holding of peaceful elections. Despite this progress, challenges remain, notably high poverty rates and continued impact on private sector activities.
Private sector engagement is recognized as crucial for post-conflict economic growth. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have proven effective in developing infrastructure in sectors such as power, water and telecommunications and in promoting job creation.
The experiences of Rwanda and Sierra Leone clearly illustrate that economic recovery is not an isolated task. Rwanda’s success is deeply linked to the restoration of peace and effective governance. Sierra Leone’s progress is similarly linked to successful disarmament and peaceful political transitions. Post-conflict reconstruction is explicitly defined as a “holistic and multidimensional process” in which economic improvements are inseparable from military, political and social conditions. States that fail to break the cycle of conflict often find themselves trapped in a vicious cycle of economic decline.
For New Gaza, economic development plans must be closely integrated with security sector reform and governance initiatives. Without a stable security environment and legitimate governance, private investment will be discouraged and any economic gains will remain fragile and unsustainable. This requires a coordinated, cross-sectoral planning approach, where economic incentives are strategically used to enhance peace and stability, and vice versa. This means creating transparent regulatory frameworks, promoting a favorable business environment, and leveraging international assistance to catalyze private investment.
Visual representations of modern, sustainable agricultural practices, such as vertical farming, hydroponics, solar-powered irrigation, and precision farming with drones, along with images of clean and innovative industrial zones, would effectively demonstrate a commitment to environmental awareness and technological advancement in New Gaza’s economic activities.
Green Infrastructure and Climate Resilience. Green infrastructure represents a promising and versatile solution to address today’s urban challenges. It effectively mitigates the urban heat island effect, significantly improves air quality, promotes biodiversity, improves public health, and offers tangible economic benefits. Examples of such infrastructure include green roofs, vertical gardens, large urban parks, strategically planted street trees, permeable pavements, and integrated duct systems designed to cool the surrounding environments.
Sustainable architecture, a core component of this approach, prioritizes energy consumption reduction through passive design principles. This includes strategic solar shading, reliance on natural ventilation, effective insulation, and the careful use of natural and maintenance-free materials. Climate-resilient urban planning involves further adjusting zoning regulations to promote denser mixed-use neighborhoods, repurposing underutilized buildings, promoting urban infill, and implementing transit-oriented development to reduce reliance on private vehicles. A key aspect of this planning is the creation of multifunctional public spaces that prioritize pedestrians and civilian life over vehicular traffic.
Singapore’s “Garden City” project stands out as a leading example of the widespread integration of green infrastructure. This initiative includes extensive green roofs and vertical gardens, with an ambitious goal of covering half of the country with green space by 2030. These efforts are designed not only for aesthetic appeal, but also for practical benefits such as heat reduction, water retention and flood protection. Similarly, New York City’s “Green Infrastructure Plan” utilizes green roofs and stormwater basins to effectively prevent urban flooding.
For New Gaza, visual elements could include urban landscapes with prominent green roofs, buildings with integrated solar panels, lush urban parks and smart city features such as smart street lighting and integrated public transport systems. These visual elements would convey a vibrant, sustainable and nature-filled urban environment.
Resource management and environmental sustainability. Sustainable resource management is a crucial framework that ensures that the needs of today’s society are met without compromising the ability of future generations to thrive. This approach fosters resilient ecosystems and promotes responsible resource use. Its core principles involve conserving natural resources, preserving biodiversity, significantly reducing waste and emissions, and maintaining a delicate ecological balance. Key principles guiding this management include efficiency, conservation, resilience, and an integrated approach to resource allocation. Climate change poses a significant challenge to these efforts, as it directly affects resource availability and distribution.
The integration of renewable energy sources is a cornerstone of sustainable urban development. Smart cities are increasingly incorporating various renewable energy technologies such as solar energy (through rooftop installations, solar parking canopies, and large-scale solar parks), wind energy (via urban turbines and wind farms), hydropower, geothermal energy, and biomass energy. Smart grids play a key role in improving the efficiency of energy distribution and facilitating the seamless integration of these renewable energy sources into the urban fabric.
In agriculture, sustainable practices are essential for long-term food security and environmental health. Techniques such as crop rotation, organic farming and precision agriculture not only improve soil health and reduce water use, but also contribute significantly to rural livelihoods.
Visual elements for New Gaza could showcase large-scale renewable energy infrastructure, such as extensive wind farms and solar PV systems, alongside advanced water management systems such as desalination plants and smart irrigation networks. Images of waste-to-energy plants would further underscore the commitment to technological solutions to environmental challenges.
The role of international partners. A wide range of international partners play crucial, albeit diverse, roles in post-conflict recovery and development. The World Bank focuses on long-term economic development, poverty reduction, and support for the transition to sustainable peace. Its interventions include investments in key productive sectors, rehabilitation of financial institutions, and reconstruction of essential infrastructure such as roads, schools, and health centers. Although the World Bank is not an aid agency, its role is crucial in bridging the gap between immediate humanitarian assistance and long-term development initiatives.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides critical macroeconomic assistance, policy advice, and technical expertise to stabilize economies and restore confidence. It offers short- and medium-term loans to countries facing balance of payments problems or other economic challenges.
Various UN agencies, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), along with numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs), play a central role in delivering humanitarian assistance. This assistance includes food, shelter, healthcare, education and protection services. In addition to immediate assistance, these organizations are essential for the implementation of long-term development projects, including capacity building and infrastructure development.
Despite the multitude of actors and the recognized importance of their contributions, a persistent challenge in post-conflict settings is the “coordination deficit” that often exists across sectors, agencies and donors. This fragmentation often leads to siloed operations, where humanitarian, development and peace efforts continue independently of each other, hindering effective and coherent assistance. The concept of the “Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) Nexus” emerged precisely to address this problem, with the aim of improving the integration and coherence of these efforts.
Research consistently highlights the fragmentation of international aid efforts, with clear “silos” often observed between humanitarian, development and peace actors. Although the HDP Nexus is a recognized framework for integration, its operationalization remains difficult in practice. This fragmentation can lead to significant inefficiencies, duplication of effort, and an inability to address the interconnected root causes of conflict and underdevelopment in a holistic manner. The World Bank explicitly states that it is not an aid agency, underscoring the critical need for clear roles, defined responsibilities, and seamless transitions between different types of assistance to ensure comprehensive support. 

For New Gaza, it is crucial to establish a dedicated, empowered and centralized coordination body, likely under the authority of the UN Special Representative. This body will ensure that the various efforts of international partners are coherent, strategically sequenced and mutually reinforcing. Such a mechanism requires moving beyond a “hands-off, eyes-on” approach to active, integrated planning that prioritizes local ownership and avoids creating new dependencies or exacerbating existing inequalities. Financing mechanisms should be flexible, predictable and multi-year to support long-term strategic objectives rather than being limited to short-term emergency response efforts. This comprehensive and flexible international aid architecture is essential to translate external support into concrete, sustainable results for New Gaza.
5. Social Integration: Building a Cohesive Society
Large-scale Resettlement Programmes
Successful large-scale resettlement of populations requires a comprehensive and integrated approach that goes beyond simply providing shelter. It includes robust strategies for housing, essential infrastructure and social services, as well as proactive measures for social inclusion.
A primary challenge in large-scale resettlement is the widespread lack of affordable and accessible housing, a crisis often exacerbated by existing national housing shortages and inadequate federal assistance. Beyond mere accessibility, cultural acceptance and discrimination pose significant barriers to access to housing for resettled populations. This can manifest itself as racial stereotypes, misunderstandings by property managers, or concerns related to family size or cooking odors. In addition, rapid urbanization and the proliferation of unplanned, informal settlements in many contexts complicate the provision of adequate infrastructure and hinder effective social inclusion in resettlement scenarios.
Best practices for housing provision emphasize a consultative approach that involves both displaced persons and host communities in site selection. The selected sites should offer reliable access to productive resources, employment and business opportunities to promote livelihood restoration, and efforts should be made to maintain community continuity. It is also essential to provide clear title deeds without associated fees to ensure security of tenure. Adequate resources should be allocated for shelter, essential infrastructure (such as water supply and access roads) and social services (including schools and health care). Home-built or self-built housing, supported by technical assistance and construction subsidies, is often more readily accepted and better tailored to the needs of resettlers than contractor-built options.
Effective integration with host communities is a key policy objective. Resettlers should be socially and economically integrated, and host populations should be fully informed and consulted about the resettlement plan. It is crucial that conditions and services in host communities are improved, or at least not worsened, to prevent conflicts arising from resource scarcity or perceived inequality.
The available evidence consistently highlights that housing is much more than just physical shelter; it is a crucial factor for economic opportunity, social cohesion and cultural adaptation. Challenges in housing provision directly impact access to employment, education and essential social services and can lead to segregation, disillusionment and the retention of a “segregated ‘Other’ population”. Conversely, successful housing strategies emphasize community participation, livelihood restoration, and seamless integration with host communities. This demonstrates a clear causal link, where effective housing directly promotes broader social and economic integration and serves as a foundation for a stable and cohesive society.
For New Gaza, housing reconstruction must therefore be a central pillar of the social integration strategy, explicitly framed as a development opportunity rather than simply an aid effort. This requires a holistic urban planning approach that proactively links housing provision with economic opportunities (e.g. proximity to jobs and markets), social infrastructure (schools, health facilities, and public spaces), and deep cultural sensitivity. It is crucial to involve displaced populations in the planning and design phases of housing projects, and to ensure clear and secure property rights. It is crucial to avoid the creation of new informal settlements and to actively address existing inequalities to prevent future social tensions and ensure equitable development.

Promoting social cohesion and cultural exchange
Effective strategies to promote social integration and build cohesive communities among resettled populations are multifaceted. These include implementing mentoring programs that pair newcomers with volunteers and professionals from the local community and provide guidance and support as they adjust to their new environment. Organizing social gatherings and community events, such as potlucks, game nights, or volunteer days, is essential to foster connections between resettled populations and members of the host community. Creating opportunities for participation in community activities such as sports teams or hobby groups encourages further interaction. In addition, establishing online platforms and forums can provide refugees with access to resources and a means to connect with others who share similar experiences and interests.
Cultural exchange programs are essential for cultivating mutual understanding and respect. These initiatives bring resettled populations and host communities together to share cultural customs and traditions and learn from each other’s customs. Language instruction, cultural orientation programs, and vocational training are essential components that enable refugees to access education, employment, and social services, thereby promoting their full participation in society. Ultimately, robust community engagement and social participation are essential to fostering a sense of belonging and social inclusion among all residents.
Visual representations of vibrant, inclusive public spaces such as parks, community centers, and town squares, designed to foster interaction and cultural expression, would have a major impact for New Gaza. These visual elements could depict people from diverse backgrounds engaging in communal activities, celebrating cultural festivals, or participating in learning environments, reflecting a harmonious blend of local culture and modern design.
Preservation of Cultural Heritage
Cultural heritage, which includes both tangible assets such as buildings and monuments and intangible elements such as traditions, languages, and rituals, is deeply vulnerable during times of conflict and displacement. Displacement in particular severely disrupts the intergenerational transmission of cultural knowledge and practices and threatens the very fabric of identity. Preserving this heritage is essential for maintaining the identity, dignity and overall well-being of displaced communities.
Strategies for preserving cultural heritage include systematically documenting and protecting cultural practices, providing technical assistance, raising awareness of the importance of intangible cultural heritage, and supporting local communities in continuing their traditions, even in new environments. Integrating cultural heritage into modern urban planning and architecture can be achieved through the adaptive reuse of heritage buildings, preserving original architectural features while incorporating modern amenities. This also involves incorporating traditional design elements, materials and cultural motifs into new construction, and creating heritage trails and public spaces that celebrate local history and identity.
The destruction or loss of cultural heritage in conflict-affected regions exacerbates personal and social trauma. Conversely, actively integrating cultural heritage into recovery efforts can contribute significantly to healing, rebuilding social cohesion, strengthening resilience and creating conditions for sustainable development. This underlines that cultural preservation is not just about protecting artefacts; it is fundamentally about rebuilding a collective identity and fostering a sense of continuity and belonging, which are essential for a traumatised population to recover and thrive.
For New Gaza, heritage preservation should be a central, integrated pillar of the recovery plan. This involves going beyond mere physical restoration to actively support intangible cultural heritage, including traditions, stories and languages. The plan should prioritise identifying and protecting significant historical sites, supporting traditional crafts and arts, and integrating local architectural styles and cultural motifs into new urban designs. By doing so, New Gaza can foster a strong sense of shared identity, promote collective healing and build social cohesion, transforming a legacy of loss into a robust foundation for cultural renewal and lasting peace.
6. Experiences and recommendations for New Gaza. Synthesizing understandings from case studies.
Analysis of different post-conflict transitions reveals several recurring themes and crucial lessons for the establishment of New Gaza:
• UN Transitional Administrations (UNTAET, UNMIK, UNMISS): A crucial understanding is that genuine government legitimacy is an endogenous process that cannot be imposed externally. Top-down approaches that ignore local power structures and norms often lead to a “crisis of legitimacy” and a lack of accountability among the population. For effective demilitarization and governance in unstable environments lacking clear territorial consent, a robust Chapter VII mandate from the UN Security Council is essential, as it provides the necessary authority and robust use of force capabilities. In addition, a long-term international presence for institutional mentoring and support is needed, with gradual withdrawal contingent on proven local capacity and ownership, rather than rigid timelines. The difficulty of demobilizing and reintegrating informal armed groups, combined with a lack of support from the host state, can significantly undermine stability and state-building efforts.
• Economic reconstruction (Rwanda, Sierra Leone): Economic recovery is inextricably linked to security, governance and social conditions. Successful transitions integrate economic development into a broader peace-building framework. Creating an enabling environment for private sector development is crucial for sustainable growth, job creation and reducing the risk of renewed conflict. Economic plans must also address underlying problems such as high unemployment and poverty to ensure long-term stability.
• Resettlement and social integration: Housing is a multifaceted challenge, encompassing affordability, accessibility, cultural acceptance and clear property rights. It requires comprehensive planning that goes beyond simply providing housing to address its role in broader social and economic integration. Active participation of both displaced populations and host communities in planning and implementation is essential for successful integration and prevention of new tensions. Policies need to be designed with deep cultural sensitivity to foster mutual understanding and respect and promote social cohesion rather than exacerbate divisions.
• Coordination of international assistance: While the need for integrated humanitarian, development and peace efforts is recognized, operationalizing this “nexus” remains a challenge due to siloed funding and activities among international actors. Effective coordination requires strengthened leadership and predictable, flexible and multi-year funding to ensure coherent and complementary interventions.
Addressing potential challenges for the New Gaza
The transformation of Gaza into a land of peace will undoubtedly face significant challenges. Sustained and unwavering commitment from key international and regional actors, as well as new local leaders, is essential to navigate the complexity and long-term nature of the transition. Ensuring adequate, flexible and multi-year funding is essential; Moving away from short-term relief cycles is essential for sustainable development and institution-building. Establishing a robust and consistently enforced demilitarized zone, supported by an international force with a strong mandate, is an indispensable prerequisite for any other reconstruction effort. Finally, it will require a deliberate and sustained effort to identify, strengthen and integrate local leaders and community structures in all phases of planning and implementation to overcome the inherent difficulty that external actors have in promoting internal legitimacy, to ensure that solutions are locally relevant and sustainable.

Recommendations for New Gaza:

Miljøpåvirkning – Leveomkostninger – Social ulighed – Belastning af infrastruktur – Fællesskabers modstandsdygtighed

Miljøpåvirkning;

Based on the comprehensive analysis of post-conflict transitions and the specific requirements of New Gaza, the following recommendations are presented:
1. Mandate a UN Chapter VII Transitional Administration: This will provide the necessary authority and flexibility to establish security and governance in a highly complex and potentially contested environment, allowing for decisive action without being paralyzed by the lack of consent of entrenched or fragmented local actors.
2. Implement a multi-layered, trust-based demilitarized zone: Design a demilitarized zone with robust monitoring systems, drawing lessons from the impartiality and trust-building mechanisms of the Sinai MFO and the clear demarcation of the Korean Demilitarized Zone. Integrate diplomatic and liaison functions to foster trust between the parties, recognizing that peace is as much a function of human relations as it is of military withdrawal.
3. Implement a comprehensive, contextual DDR programme: Integrate disarmament with comprehensive economic and social reintegration initiatives tailored to the specific profiles and needs of former combatants in Gaza. This programme should offer viable economic alternatives, vocational training, psychosocial support and clear pathways to civilian life, as successful peacebuilding is conditional on transforming combatants into productive citizens.
4. Prioritize authentic local ownership and capacity-building: From the outset, design governance structures and electoral processes that genuinely reflect and reinforce local leadership and traditional norms, avoiding the imposition of external models. Ensure long-term international mentoring and support for local institutions, recognizing that genuine legitimacy is an endogenous process.
5. Establish an impartial framework for property restitution and comprehensive land management: This framework should go beyond legal requirements and also include physical reconstruction, alternative housing solutions and fair compensation. It requires strong, impartial enforcement mechanisms and dispute resolution processes that are sensitive to the local context and prevent new conflicts arising from land issues, recognizing the potential for land issues to reignite conflicts.
6. Implement an integrated sustainable development initiative: Focus on private sector-led economic growth, climate-resilient urban planning (e.g. green roofs, solar integration, smart grids), and sustainable resource management (water, energy, waste). Create an enabling environment for both local and foreign investment that recognizes the virtuous circle between security, governance, and economic growth.
7. Build a cohesive society through inclusive social integration: Develop housing solutions that are affordable, culturally sensitive, and promote community continuity. Invest heavily in comprehensive language training, education, employment programs, and cultural exchange initiatives to foster mutual understanding and belonging, recognizing that housing is a focal point for multidimensional integration.
8. Integrate cultural heritage conservation as a core element of reconstruction: Actively identify, protect and revitalize tangible and intangible cultural heritage as a means of collective healing, identity-building and promoting social cohesion among populations, recognizing its therapeutic and unifying power in post-conflict recovery.
9. Establish a unified and strengthened international aid coordination mechanism: Establish a centralized body, potentially led by the UN Special Representative, to ensure coherent, strategically sequenced and mutually reinforcing humanitarian, development and peace efforts, supported by flexible, multi-year funding that addresses the historical fragmentation of aid efforts.

Ny Gaza Production Collective.

The traditional trend of urbanization, driven by concentrated political and financial power, has led to the neglect and depopulation of local communities worldwide. In light of this global population movement, which has caused urbanization with inequality, poverty and unhealthy lifestyles, as well as the consequent depopulation of local communities, it is imperative to recognize the socio-economic opportunities that arise from the development of new, strong local communities. This urbanization has proven to be self-defeating, as urban centers face catastrophic challenges such as inequality, poverty, unemployment, crime, environmental pollution, unhealthy lifestyles and high cost of living. Conversely, decentralized communities offer a healthy lifestyle with lower cost of living, more equality, empathetic community and improved opportunities for healthy self-sufficiency, especially with the emergence of sustainable technologies and new opportunities with the internet and artificial intelligence. This paradigm shift towards decentralized living, supported by digital technology and AI systems, is not only a quantum leap towards environmental sustainability, but also an improvement in public health, fair and equitable living conditions and economic prosperity.

(1) All production collectives in ‘New Gaza’, a green, sustainable and organized layout is an indispensable standard.
(2) Service facilities are located in the middle of the collective, as a central prominent hub.
(3) The seven housing groups are arranged in a circular or radial pattern around this central service hub.
(4) The seven housing groups each have 7 individual family houses of approximately 80 m², with visible solar panels on their roofs.
(5) Each of these seven housing groups each has a circular common / greenhouse in the center, arranged with the seven family houses around.
(6) The housing collective is surrounded by dedicated production buildings and large, cultivated fields for food production and other production activities.
(7) There is an emphasis on aesthetics, environmentally friendly and community-oriented living and production.

7. Conclusion: Realizing the vision:

The New Gaza is built by production communities, each with approximately 10,000 inhabitants. The production community, which is mainly self-sufficient, minimizes energy consumption to less than its own production of energy but solar, wind and other energy extraction.
Surpluses from self-production are provided as contributions to newly started new sustainable communities.

The transformation of Gaza into a “New Gaza – A Land of Peace” represents an ambitious but achievable vision for post-conflict recovery and a potential model for sustainable peace and development in the wider region. While the challenges are enormous and include deep-rooted security concerns, complex governance transitions and extensive reconstruction needs, a strategic, integrated and locally-driven approach offers a viable way forward. This report has emphasized that success depends on a robust UN-managed framework, a demilitarized environment built on trust, comprehensive disarmament and reintegration, and the cultivation of authentic local ownership. By prioritizing sustainable development, inclusive social integration and the revitalization of cultural heritage, combined with a comprehensive and adaptable international assistance architecture, the legacy of conflict can indeed be transformed into a future defined by peace, prosperity and social harmony for all residents of New Gaza.

The Urbanization Paradox: Challenges vs. Solutions.

The Urbanization Paradox: Challenges vs. Solutions This chart illustrates the core argument for decentralization by contrasting the systemic problems of traditional hyper-urbanization with the benefits offered by the proposed sustainable community model. It visualizes the shift from a high-impact, high-cost paradigm to a resilient, low-impact, and human-centric alternative.